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Legal Ethics
by Roy M. Sobelson*

One of the traditional hallmarks of the American legal profession has
been its virtual freedom from regulation. If there is any theme evident in
recent developments in the legal ethics field, it is that this freedom is
under increasing attack from clients, courts, the bar, and the legislature.
The year 1992 was no exception, with a number of challenges made to
the authority of individual lawyers and the profession itself. The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected one lawyer's challenge to mandatory
court appointments1 and another's freedom to contract with a client for
unlimited authority to settle cases.2
The supreme court and court of appeals heard a disturbingly large
number of "ineffective assistance of counsel" and malpractice claims. Although the couris rejected most claims, they remanded several "ineffective assistance" claims even in the face of seemingly rigid rules requiring
that parties raise such claims at the first possible instance.3 In one of the
more unusual and disturbing cases discussed here, the court of appeals
held that charging excessive fees may constitute legal malpractice.'
The courts and legislature both have stepped in to regulate important
aspects of lawyering. The supreme court now requires that lawyers participate in Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts ("IOLTA")6 and assesses
Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Emory University
(B.A., 1972); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1976); Temple University School of
Law (LL.M., 1982). Member, Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, State Bar of
Georgia Committee on Professionalism, Formal Advisory Opinion Board.
1. Sacandy v. Walther, 262 Ga. 11, 413 S.E.2d 727 (1992).
2. Lewis v. Uselton, 202 Ga. App. 875, 416 S.E.2d 94 (1992).
3. See infra part IV.
4. Findley v. Davis, 202 Ga. App. 332, 414 S.E.2d 317 (1991).
5. STATE BAR OF GEORGiA HANDBOOK 80 (1992) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. Effective July 1,
1991, all lawyers must put all client funds in "either an interest-bearing account with the
interest being paid to the client or an ... [IOLTA] account with the interest being paid to
the Georgia Bar Foundation ..... Id. (quoting Standard 65(B)).
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them annually to fund the Clients' Security Fund.' The court may soon
adopt new rules suggesting specific pro bono obligations 7 and standards
holding lawyers responsible for actions by their peers.' Furthermore, the
legislature just passed a bill regulating legal advertising.' All of these are
examples of increasing control over lawyers, both individually and
collectively.
It is impossible to review all of these developments here. This Article
will cover only the Supreme Court of Georgia Formal Advisory Opinions
and Georgia court cases decided between June 1, 1991, and May 31, 1992
that significantly affect Georgia lawyers and their profession.
I.

FORMAL ADVISORY OPINIONS

In 1991 the supreme court issued four Formal Advisory Opinions
("FAO").' 0 FAO 91-1" addressed the propriety of a lawyer drafting a will
or trust naming himself executor or trustee. The conduct must be evalu6. The fund provides "monetary relief to persons who suffer reimbursable losses as a
result of the dishonest conduct of Members of the State Bar of Georgia." Id. at 176 (quoting
Preamble). For the first tinie since its establishment in 1968, the court has authorized an
assessment of all bar members ($100/member, billed at $20/year for five years). Conversation with Bridget Bagley, Assistant General Counsel, State Bar of Georgia (July 8, 1992).
7. See infra note 65.
8. The State Bar of Georgia has given notice of its intent to adopt Standard 71, imposing responsibility, particularly on senior or supervising attorneys, for many colleagues' actions. Standard 72 will provide that all lawyers, even those acting under direction, are responsible for their own conduct. GA. ST. BAR NEWS, May/June 1992, at 11. These rules are
substantially the same as MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1 and 5.2(a)
(1983), already adopted in most states. STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON, JR., REGULATIONS
OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 3 (1992).
9. Official Code of Georgia Annotated, ["O.C.G.A."] § 10-1-427 (1992), prohibiting false
or deceptive legal advertising, will be enforced by the Office of Consumer Affairs. Since false
legal advertising is punishable under the Bar Rules the act may conflict or overlap with
disciplinary rules established by the supreme court. See HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 74
(Standard 5, which prohibits "false, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading communications
about the lawyer or the lawyer's services.").
10. Opinions are drafted by the Formal Advisory Opinion Board, but issued by the supreme court. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 97 (Rule 4-403). Many have complained of the
difficulty in finding these opinions, which are not officially published by the court. This
spring, the State Bar adopted a new format to make them readily accessible. The new
Handbook contains all Bar rules, including those of the Investigative Panel, Disciplinary
Board, and Formal Advisory Opinion Board, and all Advisory Opinions issued previously by
") or, more recently, by the supreme court
the State Disciplinary Board ("SDB No. _
("FAO No._"). Amendments or supplements will be printed in the Georgia State Bar
Journal so they may be clipped and inserted in the Handbook.

11.

HANDBOOK,

supra note 5, at 146.
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ated under Georgia State Bar Rules Standard of Conduct ("Standard;')
30,12 which provides:
Except with the written consent or written notice to his client after full
disclosure a lawyer shall not accept or continue employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal
interests. '
The opinion; recognizing the high degree of trust and familiarity between lawyer and client that often exists in these cases, rejects a rule of
per se impropriety. Since the lawyer's self interest is obvious, the question is how he can best get written consent after "full disclosure," a term
not defined in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model
Code") or Standards. The opinion takes a practical, but rigorous and
meaningful, approach requiring that the lawyer explain", the following to
his client: "(i) all potential choices . . . their relative abilities, competence
. ..fees structure; (ii) .. .exact role of the lawyer as fiduciary . . . (iii)
potential for the attorney hiring him or herself. . . and the fee . . .(iv)
potential advantages . . . of seeking independent legal advice."'"

Consistent with Georgia Bar Rule Ethical Consideration ("EC") 5-6's
admonition against exercising undue influence on the client's choice, 6 the
opinion states a lawyer should not "promote himself or herself or consciously influence the client in the decision."17 Although this is scarcely
more than the EC says, it is difficult to see what other direction could be
given in this regard, unless the practice were prohibited altogether.
However, the opinion does address one specific example of improper
self-dealing: "double dipping" on fees. If the lawyer properly names himself, making him eligible to receive fees for performing dual services, he
''may not charge both the client and the estate or trust for a single
task.""'
12. The MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, GILLERS, supra note 8, at 301-88,
has been substantially adopted in Georgia. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 48. Part IV authorizes the State Bar to adopt Standards of Conduct and punish violations thereof. Id. at 73.
To date, there are 70 Standards. Id. at 74-82.
13. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 77 (quoting Standard 30).
14. The disclosure may be oral or written, but the consent must be in writing. Id. at 146
(citing FAO 91-1).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 58. Ethical Consideration [hereinafter EC] 5-6 provides: "A lawyer should not
consciously influence a client to name him as executor, trustee, or lawyer in an instrument.
In those cases where a client wishes to name his lawyer as such, care should be taken by the.
lawyer to avoid even the appearance of impropriety." Id.
17. Id. at 146 (citing FAO 91-1).
18. Id.
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The opinion is helpful in two ways. First, the opinion establishes that
this practice is ethically permissible under limited circumstances. Second,
as an addendum, the opinion contains a "Form Notification and Consent
Letter," which is quite thorough, and could well serve as a model for
other notification forms.
In FAO 91-2,19 the issue was whether lawyers must deposit certain fees
in their trust accounts. This is not an easy question since there are so
many different fee arrangements, including "retainers," "advances,"
"fixed," "flat," and "prepaid" fees. Not only is it possible to treat them
all differently, considerable confusion exists about the differences between them. Thus the opinion begins:
Question presented: Whether a lawyer may deposit into a general operating account a retainer that represents payment of fees yet to be earned.
The question posed by the correspondent is not clear. "Fees yet to be
earned" are prepaid fees. "Prepaid fees" also include "fixed" or "flat
fees," which are not earned until the task is completed. The terms "retainer" and "prepaid fees" have different meanings."'
One approach would be to distinguish retainers from other fees and
hold that since a retainer is earned when paid,21 -the lawyer may (or even
must) place it in a general operating account, a trust account being for
clients' funds only.2 2 Lawyers could then be required to place all other

fees in a trust account, withdrawn only as earned, since the fee belongs to
the client until the lawyer earns it. But that solution would require lawyers and clients to carefully distinguish between various fee arrangements, deciding in each case who owns the fee and at what point ownership transfers from client to lawyer. Instead, the opinion makes it simple.
Noting that lawyers are fiduciaries regardless of the fee arrangement, the
opinion holds that lawyers need not place fees in trust accounts "absent
special circumstances necessary to protect the interest of a client. 2 3
Although uniform treatment of all fees has an appealing simplicity, it
suffers from two potential defects. First, it leaves one real ambiguity. After conceding that a "retainer" may be earned merely by being "on call"
instead of performing a specific task, the opinion also says that all fees
give rise to a duty to "return to the client any unearned portion of the
19. Id. at 148.
20. Id. at 148-49.
21. Id. at 148. FAO 91-2, citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979), defines a retainer as "the fee which the client pays when he retains the attorney to act for him, and
thereby prevents him from acting for his adversary." HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 148. There
is a strong presumption against such retainers since they are nonrefundable.
22. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 80 (Standard 65(A)).
23. Id. at 148 (quoting FAO 91-2).
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fee. 2 4 Indeed, .failure to do so is a disciplinable offense.2 5 Thus, it is unclear whether the opinion leaves room for the possibility of "earning" a
retainer by doing nothing other than being "on call." 26
Second, given the number of disputes, disbarments, and suspensions
that arise from lawyers' collection of fees and refusal to refund them after
doing no vwork,27 it may be unwise to leave "special circumstances" within
the sole discretion of attorneys. It is not hard to imagine instances in
which funds placed in an operating account dissipate more rapidly than is
justified based upon work done. Thus, a client who decides to fire his
attorney may be unable to collect his money immediately.28 This problem
could be remedied by requiring that fees first be placed in a trust account, withdrawn only as earned. This would also make it clear to clients
at all times how much they are paying, and for what services.
In FAO 91-3,"9 the question was whether lawyers may pay nonlawyer
employees bonuses based upon a firm's receipts. Standard 26, which generally prohibits the practice, 0 seems to answer the question clearly, but
several factors weighed in the balance. The American Bar Association
("ABA") has issued contrary opinions on the matter, first prohibiting.
Christmas bonuses based upon profits2 1 and then permitting payments

based upon profits to office administrators.8 2 In addition, although the
Model Code was amended in 1980 to allow "compensation or retirement
plans""2 based on profits, Georgia did not adopt the amendment.
Considering that the rule is intended to insure that lawyers' judgments
on clients' behalf are made only on the basis of proper legal considerations,84 the opinion finds the distinction between the two ABA opinions
24. Id.
25. Id. at 76 (Standard 23).
26. Id. at 148 (citing FAO 91-2).
27., See, e.g., In re Booker, 262 Ga. 291, 417 S.E.2d 10,(1992), in which the attorney
collected fees from several clients, did no work, refused refund requests, and then absconded
with the fee payments. Id. at 292, 417 S.E.2d at 10. Booker was disbarred. Id. at 293, 417
S.E.2d at 11.
28. See, e.g., In re Yokely, 261 Ga. 521, 407 S.E.2d 745 (1991), in which Yokely moved
money from escrow to an operating account, although there was a dispute over the money
negotiated for his client's settlement. Id. at 521, 407 S.E.2d at 745.
29. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 149.
30. The Standard, which is identical to Model Code Disciplinary Rule [hereinafter DR]
3-102, states that a lawyer "shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that . . ."
HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 56 (quoting DR 3-102). The exceptions deal with payment to
former partners'* estates and retirement plans, neither of which is present in this opinion.
31. ABA Comm'n on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 792 (1964).
32. ABA Comm'n on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1440 (1979).
33. GILLERS, supra note 8, at 337 (quoting DR 3-102(A)(3)).
34. Id. at 342. Model Code Canon 5, which requires that "[A] Lawyer Should Exercise
Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client." Id.
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"unpersuasive." Thus, the opinion retains the literal reading of Standard
26 and holds that the only permissible profit sharing with nonlawyer employees is "in the context of a retirement plan." 5
Although sticking to the literal language is understandable, it is not
clear which principle explains the propriety of including employees even
in retirement plans, in the face of strictures against nonlawyers influencing lawyers' decisions. Surely, the fact that the plan only comes into play
at retirement does not erase the possibility of decisionmaking based on
nonlegal considerations. Nevertheless, the opinion does make clear that
whatever "exceptions" will be found must be at least within the literal
language of the Standards.36

FAO 92-11 7 addressed the propriety of a law firm using a draw account,
secured by a note from the firm's lawyers, to pay litigation expenses.
Since lawyers are already permitted to advance these costs to clients,3s'
the court had no problem approving the arrangement, as well as passing
the interest charges on to clients, so long as: (i) the client is informed of
the interest charges and the fact he is "ultimately liable" for the advances;3 9 and (ii) the arrangement does not affect confidentiality or other
obligations owed the client.4 Thus, the lawyer may not reveal to the bank
the identity of individual clients or the reason for withdrawals when
made."1
Georgia courts also made two unusual decisions dealing with Formal
Advisory Opinions. The supreme court took the unprecedented step of
publishing an opinion declining to adopt or reject proposed Opinion 88R7, which would have made it "ethically improper for an attorney to engage in simultaneous representation of the county and private parties in
matters adverse to the county."'
It is not surprising that the court would not adopt the proposed opinion. The opinion used a conventional conflicts of interest analysis that
prohibits simultaneous representation of opposing parties, even in unrelated matters, because of concerns about confidentiality, loyalty, and preserving lawyers' independent judgment on behalf of clients.' The Board
35.

HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 149 (citing FAO 91-3).

36. Id.
37. Id. at 150 (citing FAO 92.1).
38. Id. at 78 (Standard 32).
39. The opinion clearly recognizes that the fact the client remains "ultimately liable"
does not obligate the lawyer to attempt to enforce this liability. That question is left entirely to the lawyer's discretion. Id. at 149 (citing FAO 91-3).

40. Id. at 151.
41.
42.

See id. at 77 (Standard 28).
Request for Issuance of Proposed Formal Advisory Opinion, Request No. 88-R7, 261

Ga. 497, 497, 406 S.E.2d 81, 81 (1991).
43.

See International Business Mach. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3rd Cir. 1978).
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had also held client consent unavailing since this was not an instance in
which it was "obvious that [the lawyer] can adequately represent the interest of each. . . ." Although the proposed analysis was traditional, it
can be harsh in a state that relies heavily on part time attorneys to represent the state and municipalities.4 '
One wonders whether this opinion, purporting to make no decision, is
really an implicit rejection of the Board's opinion. The court could have
just refused to act on the proposal." By publishing the opinion, the court
may be sending the message that this conduct will not be condemned,
even if it is not specifically condoned. Although the court may be correct
in rejecting a per se rule of impropriety, its decision may suggest that
simultaneous representation is not a serious ethical problem, surely a
message the court does not wish to convey.
In Rotleston v. Munford,"7 the court of appeals had to decide what effect a FAO has outside the disciplinary process.4 Munford fired lawyer
Rolleston and hired Huie. When Huie demanded that Rolleston turn
Munford's papers over to him, Rolleston refused, claiming a statutory retaining lien. 4' Huie showed Rolleston FAO 87-5,s° which held that lawyers' statutory lien rights "must give way to their ethical obligation not to
cause their clients prejudice."''
When Rolleston still refused to comply, Munford moved to compel him
to do so. Munford won the motion, Rolleston complied, and Munford
then sought attorney fees for the action to force Rolleston to comply."1
44. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 77 (Standard 28).
45. See, e.g., id. at 134 (FAO 86-1, lawyer serving simultaneously as state legislator and
part time solicitor); id. at 135 (citing FAO 86-2, part time judge serving as criminal defense
counsel); id. (FAO 86-3 concerning county attorneys representing criminal defendants).
46. Although the rules do not specifically state it, the court undoubtedly has the authority to refuse to issue a proposed opinion, modify it in accordance with comments, modify it
on its own (see, e.g., id. at 148 (order of September 20, 1991, adopting FAO 91-2 with modifications)), or merely refuse to act on a proposal.
47. 201 Ga. App. 219, 410 S.E.2d 801 (1991).
48. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 95. Rule 4-223(a) makes it a complete defense to any bar
grievance that an attorney's actions were in "accordance with and in reasonable reliance
upon any. . . Formal Advisory Opinion. .. ." Id.
49. "Attorneys at law shall have a lien on all papers and money of their clients in their
possession for services rendered to them. They may retain the papers until the claims are
satisfied and may apply the money to the satisfaction of the claims." O.C.G.A. § 15-19-14(a)
(1990).
50. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 140.
51. The opinion relies upon Standard 22(b), which provides: "[A) lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to
the rights of his client, including . . . delivering. . . all papers and property to which the
client is entitled .... " Id. at 76 (quoting Standard 22(b)).
52. 201 Ga. App. at 219-20, 410 S.E.2d at 802.
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The question was whether FAO 87-5 settled the conflict between the
lien and the ethical duty so that Rolleston engaged in abusive litigation
by refusing to comply immediately.s The court conceded that FAOs have
the effect of law and act as a complete defense to bar grievances; nevertheless, "the bar rules do not specify whether

. . .

conduct not in accor-

dance with a formal advisory opinion constitutes an action contrary to
established law." 54 Looking to the meaning of "advisory" and the fact
that opinions are prospective only, the court held for Rolleston, saying:
the trial court erred by concluding that ...87-5 so controlled the issue
...that Rolleston was unable ... to advance a substantially justifiable
argument against the application of the opinion to the ... facts ....

Formal Advisory Opinions may constitute persuasive authority on ethical
questions, but we find nothing in the State Bar Rules to suggest that an

attorney is precluded as a matter of law from challenging the applicability of such opinions in a concrete context."

At first blush, the decision seems wrongheaded, if not wrongly decided,
for a couple of reasons. First, a FAO is not just an opinion written by
volunteer bar members; the supreme court issues it after deliberation,
public notice, and opportunity for oral argument." Second, the issue
raised in FAO 87-5 was how to resolve a conflict between a statute and an
ethical rule. The court, which has plenary power to regulate the practice
of law,' 7 already adopted Standard 22(b), which prohibits a discharged
lawyer from taking steps prejudicial to a client's rights." It is that very
standard that FAO 87-5 says trumps the statute." Thus, the court of appeals appears in Rolieston to find an issue recently resolved by the supreme court still open to question. 0
53. See O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(a) (Supp. 1990), allowing for the award of attorney fees to
any party "against whom another party has asserted a ... position with respect to which
there existed such a complete absence of any justiciable issue of law or fact . . . ." Id. See
also id. § 9-15-14(b) (Supp. 1992) (allowing fees if "an attorney ...brought or defended an
action . . .that lacked substantial justification .

54. 201 Ga. App. at 220, 410 S.E.2d at 803.
55. Id. at 221, 410 SE.2d at 803.
56. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 97 (Rule 4-403).
57. See, e.g., First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674 (1983),
invalidating a corporate immunity statute when applied to attorneys on the basis of the
supreme court's inherent authority to regulate the practice of law. Id. at 846-47, 302 S.E.2d
at 676.
58. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 76 (Standard 22(b)).
59. In Zagoria the court said that the legislature "cannot constitutionally cross the gulf
separating the branches of government by imposing regulations upon the practice of law."
250 Ga. at 845-46, 302 S.E.2d at 675.
60. 201 Ga. App. at 219, 410 S.E.2d at 801.
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However, Rolleston may be correct under a narrower view. Although
FAO 87-5 sounds clear, it left room for interpretation. For example, it
says the statute must yield since Standard 22(b) prohibits lawyers from
taking any actions prejudicial to clients' rights. But the opinion leaves
open the possibility that retention of a client's property would not always
be prejudicial, when it says: "[I]t would be only in the rarest of circumstances that a client could be deprived of. . . files without. . . suffering
some prejudice . . . the better practice is for attorneys to forgo retention

of client papers in all but the clearest cases.""'
Moreover, the opinion is less than crystal clear in defining items subject
to the lien. Thus, one may justify the result on the ground that Rolleston
based his actions on a good faith interpretation of FAO 87-5, rather than
its general message.
II.

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

62
'
One of the most talked about cases this year was Sacandy v. Walther,
which challenged Rome, Georgia's Indigent Defense Program, in which
lawyers are appointed to represent indigents. The court appoints those
unprepared for criminal work as uncompensated co-counsel.
Sacandy, appointed as uncompensated co-counsel, refused to serve,
paid or unpaid. She claimed she was not competent to handle a criminal
case, not interested in criminal defense, and was being forced to do work
without pay."3
Although Sacandy was not sanctioned, she sued for declaratory and injunctive relief. The supreme court held that judges have the inherent authority to appoint counsel, but not without compensation. 4 By relying
upon statutory authority the court sidestepped any constitutional issues
raised by mandating that lawyers work for free.6
Perhaps more important to a discussion of legal ethics, the court rejected, virtually without discussion, Sacandy's claim that she was inherently incompetent (thus, not appointable) for lack of experience or inter-

61. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 140 (quoting FAO 87-5).
62. 262 Ga. 11, 413 S.E.2d 727 (1992).
63. Id. at 12, 413 S.E.2d at 729.
64. Id.
65. The supreme court may soon adopt an amendment to the EC's encouraging, but not
requiring, lawyers to donate significant uncompensated legal services. The plan is to amend
Rule 3-102, EC 2-25, as follows: (i) EC 2-25(b) will define and state the need for pro bono
work; and (ii) EC 2-25(c) will state suggested guidelines for pro bono work (120 hours over a
three year period). At.least 60 of the hours should be for direct provision of legal services to
the poor. The notice does not suggest any intent to seek an amendment to either the DR's
or Standards, thus any changes would be aspirational only. See GEORGIA STATE BAR NEws,
May/June 1992, at 11.
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est in criminal law.6s In the face of a criminal justice system bursting at
the seams, it was perhaps inevitable that the court would reject any argument that would reduce the number of lawyers eligible to serve as counsel. But it would have been helpful to have given the lower courts and
lawyers some direction in deciding how to meaningfully gauge and guarantee a minimum level of competence.
In fact, the refusal to closely examine competence is nothing new. The
court and the Bar have always displayed great ambivalence about competency. Canon 6 states that: "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Compe'
but that provision has never really had any teeth. First, all the
tently,"67
EC's under Canon 6 are stated entirely in aspirational terms, saying that
lawyers "should" engage in certain activities.6 Second, the Directory
Rules ("DR") never unqualifiedly require that a lawyer offer competent
services in representing clients. Although DR 6-101 prohibits lawyers
from handling individual matters "without preparation adequate in the
circumstances," its only statement about competence bars representation
when the lawyer "knows or should know that he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent . .
Such a subjective rule may exempt lawyers from a competence requirement in many circumstances. Third, lawyers are given great discretion in
evaluating their own competence and permitted to learn on the job. EC 61 allows a lawyer to accept employment "in matters which he is or intends to become competent to handle. 7 0 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, no enforceable Standard exists under which a lawyer could be
disciplined for incompetence.7 1
III. LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS

Two types of issues predominate in recent legal malpractice cases. First
are the substantive questions. With one glaring exception, discussed infra,
Georgia courts stick to traditional rules regarding the elements of legal
malpractice.7 2 Second are questions about the malpractice affidavit re-

66..
67.
68.
69.
70.

262 Ga. at 14, 413 S.E.2d at 730.
HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 62 (Rule 3-106).
Id. (citing EC 6-1 to EC 6-6).
Id. (quoting DR 6-101(A)(1)) (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting EC 6-1) (emphasis added).

71. Cf. Id. at 79 (citing Standard 43).
72. Georgia courts have occasionally heard arguments that the traditional elements of a
malpractice claim need not always exist to state a claim. See, e.g., Driebe v. Cox, 203 Ga.
App. 8, 416 S.E.2d 314 (1992). Cox was the seller in a real estate transaction. The buyer,
Rotomco, had hired Driebe to close the transaction. Cox was aware both of Driebe's hiring
and that Driebe was not representing only Rotomco's interests, not Cox's. As a matter of
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quirements.73 These questions continue to plague the courts and provide
traps for unwary lawyers and litigants.
A.

Substantive Elements of Malpractice

The exception referred to above is Findley v. Davis,' 4 which raised the
question of whether charging excessive fees for work adequately performed is legal malpractice. Davis was hired first by plaintiff's mother,
then plaintiff, to sell their property, and then handle the mother's estate.
Davis contracted in writing for an eight percent commission on the
sales.

75

Over the years, Findley and Davis became good friends. Their relationship was so close that Davis obtained a low cost loan from Findley and
was made beneficiary of his will. Another lawyer prepared both the will
and loan documents.

76

When their relationship soured, Davis repaid the loan and renounced
all interest in the will. Findley later sued Davis for malpractice, fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, and conflict of interest, alleging that Davis: (i)
charged, without detailing the basis for, excessive fees, contrary to Standard 31;77 and (ii) borrowed money from Findley at a low interest rate,
depriving Findley of a greater potential profit on the loan, contrary to
general conflict of interest principles.
The expert's affidavit that accompanied the complaint said that the
collection of excessive fees deviated "from the required standard of skill,
care and diligence . . . utilized by other attorneys . . . under . . . similar
circumstances."" Rather than piercing the allegations with an expert's
affidavit, Davis' response merely detailed the work he had done.
fact, Cox had his own lawyer, who Cox really hired to do nothing more than make sure the
paper work was correct. Id. at 8-9, 416 S.E.2d at 314.
When problems later surfaced in the transaction, Cox sued Driebe. Since Driebe and Cox
had no lawyer-client relationship, Cox was forced to argue he was owed a duty of care by
Driebe: (i) by virtue of a gratuitous promise; or (ii) as a third party beneficiary. Id. at 9, 416
S.E.2d at 314. The court found that Cox did not prove the existence of either condition, but
did not reject the theories out of hand. Id. at 9-10, 416 S.E.2d at 315.
73. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(a) provides: "In any action ...alleging professional malpractice,
the plaintiff shall ...

file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert ... which ...

shall

set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual
basis for each such claim." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(a) (Supp. 1992).
74. 202 Ga. App. 332, 414 S.E.2d 317 (1991), cert. granted.
75. Id.at 332, 414 S.E.2d at 317-18.
76. Id. at 333, 414 S.E.2d at 318.
77. Standard 31(a) provides: "A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or
collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee." HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 77 (quoting Standard
31(a)).
78. 202 Ga. App. at 337, 414 S.E.2d at 320.
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The court of appeals first held that since the fees charged were provided in a voluntary and valid contract, it was not necessary to determine
the actual value of Davis' services.7 9 It next reiterated the well known
principle that the violation of an ethical rule such as Standard 31 does
not, by itself, state a claim for malpractice.8 0 So far, so good.
The court then made two unusual holdings. First, the court held that
the excessive fee allegation stated a claim for legal malpractice.,s It is true
that the claim can be pigeon-holed into the three elements of a malpractice claim: (i) there was an attorney-client relationship; (ii) the attorney
failed to exercise ordinary care; and (iii) negligence proximately caused
damage to the client.82 Client Findley did allege negligent overcharging.
Nevertheless, the claim usually results from a loss to the client through
mishandling his affairs, such as losing a claim by missing the statute of
limitations or failing to raise a defense that would have been successful.8 "
This holding is especially disturbing in light of the facts. The fee was
provided in a contract Findley signed and understood; he was never dissuaded from seeking other counsel; he received, without objection, the
closing statements after the sales; and perhaps most significantly, Findley
was not only satisfied with Davis' work, it was in no way deficient. Com8
bined with the rule against treating fee disputes as disciplinary matters, 4
this holding could open the floodgates to actions by clients complaining
that their lawyers have charged excessive fees, even for work that was
adequately performed.
Next, in regard to the loan, the court held that Findley suffered no
compensable loss. The court found that "appellant was completely repaid, and.

. .

any loss in interest.

. .

was voluntarily assumed and not

appellees."' 's

attributable to
Why the court did not apply this same reasoning to the fee question is
not clear. Just as the loss in interest was voluntarily assumed, so was the
payment of the fee; this is especially true in light of the other facts of the
case stated above. But borrowing money from a client is such obvious
79.

Id. at 336, 414 S.E.2d at 320.

80. Id.
81.

Id. at 337, 414 S.E.2d at 321.

82.

Id. at 336, 414 S.E.2d at 320.

83. Usually, claimant must demonstrate that he would have prevailed on the action or
defense if it had been properly raised. This is often known as the "suit within a suit" requirement. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 218 (1986).
84. See HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 154-58 (providing for arbitration of fee disputes
between lawyers and clients).
85. 202 Ga. App. at 338, 414 S.E.2d at 321.
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self-dealing" that, if anything, this part of the case deserves much more
serious consideration than the overcharging allegation.
One odd thing about Findley is the court's failure to even mention
Standard 30, which provides: "Except with the written consent. . . to his
client after full disclosure a lawyer shall not

. . .

continue employment if

the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or
reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business,, property or
personal interests ...

The aim of Standard 30 suggests that courts should look carefully at
the loan because of its obvious effect on Davis' "financial, business, property or personal interests."' 8 In the absence of "full disclosure" of the
ramifications of- lending money to his lawyer, the transaction might be
held void or even the basis for a malpractice claim. Of course, here another attorney prepared the loan documents. That fact might negate the
requirement of written consent after full disclosure, but not necessarily.
Once lawyer and client become debtor and creditor, their relationship is
significantly and permanently altered. Since this may cause the lawyer to
look more carefully at his own interests rather than those of his client,
the lawyer should have the burden of demonstrating a full explanation of
the potential harm to the client and the client's opportunity to confer
fully with other counsel.
B. Malpractice Affidavits "
The malpractice affidavit requirement, adopted to cut frivolous suits,90
has itself spawned much litigation." This year, the supreme court heard
86. It is true that the fee contract also involves self-dealing, but in fact, all fee contracts
of whatever sort suffer from that failing. Were all contracts involving self-dealing invalidated, no fees could ever be charged.
87. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 77 (Standard 30).
88. Id.
89. For an article concerning the application of the affidavit rules in Federal District
Court, see John E. Floyd & J. Scott McClain, The. Application of O.C.C.A. § 9-11-9.1 to
MalpracticeActions in Federal Court, 28 GA. ST. B.J. 212 (1992).
90. See Doctors Memorial Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 288, 378 S.E.2d 708,
710 (1989). The affidavit is purely a formal requirement, and the courts are not inclined to
evaluate the correctness of the information or the credibility of the affiant. See also Findley
v. Davis, 202 Ga. App. 332, 414 S.E.2d 317, in which the court of appeals rejected defendant's argument that the malpractice affidavit was defective because the affiant had earlier
represented the plaintiff and had a financial interest at the time. Id. at 333-34, 414 S.E.2d at
318-19.
91. See, e.g., St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Nease, 259 Ga. 153, 377 S.E.2d 847 (1989); Housing
Auth. of Savannah v. Greene, 259 Ga. 435, 383 S.E.2d 867 (1989); Barr v. Johnson, 189 Ga.
App. 136, 375 S.E.2d 51 (1988); Padgett v. Crawford, 189 Ga. App. 568, 376 S.E.2d 724
(1988).
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Cheeley v. Henderson.2 In Cheely plaintiff's complaint was accompanied
by an expert's affidavit, but the affidavit did not "set forth specifically at
least one negligent act or omission," as required by O.C.G.A. section 9-119.1(a). 8 Rather, the affidavit referred to the complaint and said, "errors
and omissions.

. .

including those.

. .

in the complaint, constituted legal

malpractice.' ' 94 After Cheeley moved to dismiss for this alleged defect,
plaintiff amended to comply with the statute.95
Cheeley's summary judgment motion for the faulty affidavit was denied, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that "[blecause Henderson had obtained an affidavit but, due to a misinterpretation ... failed
to incorporate into the affidavit itself the specific negligent acts and
omissions detailed in the complaint, Henderson's amendment . .. was

proper."' 6
Applying the law in effect at the time of judgment, the supreme court
reversed, holding that O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1(e) prohibited cure by
amendment.' On reconsideration, the supreme court said: "[T]he law
was misinterpreted .... The affidavit was statutorily insufficient because of the misinterpretation .... Everyone is presumed to know the'

law, and the law never favors those who misinterpret it."' "s
Despite Cheeley, in Thompson v. Long,99 a suit for medical malpractice, the plaintiff's misuse of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 did not harm her.
Proceeding pro se, plaintiff filed on the last possible day and alleged that
an affidavit was attached. Not only was there no affidavit attached, she
had no affidavit at the time. She then hired counsel, who amended the
complaint to take advantage of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1(b), which allows
those filing within ten days of the expiration of the statute of limitations
a grace period to produce the affidavit. 100
The question was whether plaintiff could amend her patently false
statement in the first complaint, even though she did not originally seek
the protection of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1(b).10 1 Invoking the rule that
"[a]ll pleadings . ..be so construed as to do substantial justice," 1 2 the

court of appeals reversed the trial court's granting of the motion to dis92.

197 Ga. App. 543, 398 S.E.2d 787 (1990), rev'd, 261 Ga. 498, 405 S.E.2d 865 (1991).

93.

O.C.G.A.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

§ 9-11-9.1(a) (Supp. 1992).

197 Ga. App. at 544, 398 S.E.2d at 789.
Id.
Id. at 546, 398 S.E.2d at 790.
261 Ga. at 498, 405 S.E.2d at 865.
Id. at 502-03, 405 S.E.2d at 868.
'201 Ga. App. 480, 411 S.E.2d 322 (1991).
Id. at 480, 411 S.E.2d at 323.
Id. at 481, 411 S.E.2d at 323.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(f) (1982)).
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miss. '0 The court noted that plaintiff had filed pro se and that the defect
placed defendant in no worse a position than he would have been had
plaintiff given notice of her intent to rely upon O.C.G.A. section 9-119.1(b). The court then stated:
At the time plaintiff filed her complaint, defendant and his counsel were
put on notice at a minimum that plaintiff was asserting a malpractice
claim against defendant and her claim was being asserted within ten
days of expiration of the applicable statute of limitation which would
generally allow plaintiff to invoke the exception provided by subsection
(b).'04
This same reasoning could easily apply to Cheeley. In Cheeley defendant certainly was put on notice of the alleged misconduct in plaintiff's
complaint. 1" The purpose of the affidavit requirement was fulfilled since
plaintiff had hired and produced an expert who opined in his affidavit
that "the representation . . .fell below the required standard of skill,
care, and diligence, and that certain errors and omissions .. .including

those set forth in the complaint, constituted legal malpractice."'" Moreover, plaintiff's "misinterpretation" in Cheeley was not unreasonable
under the circumstances.
Nevertheless, the rule in Cheeley was required by O.C.G.A. section 911-9.1(e), which specifically prohibits amendments in that context. The
question is whether that same result should obtain in Thompson in the
absence of statutory imperative. Perhaps it should, even with a pro se
complaint.
As strict as O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 is, it does offer two saving provisions. First, O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1(e) protects a plaintiff who has the
required affidavit, but mistakenly omits it from the complaint.'" By aiding only those who have obtained the expert's affidavit, the exception is
entirely consistent with the statute's purpose of cutting down on baseless
complaints, especially since it requires that a court actually "determine[]
that the plaintiff had the requisite affidavit available

. . ."'Is

Second,

O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1(b) saves plaintiffs who may lose a claim because
they have not been able to obtain the needed expert in time. The plaintiff
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 482, 411 S.E.2d at 324.
Id.
See 197 Ga. App. at 544, 398 S.E.2d at 789.
Id.
"[Ilf a plaintiff fails to file an affidavit as required ...

dismissal ...

such complaint is subject to

and cannot be cured by amendment ... unless a court determines that the

plaintiff had the requisite affidavit available ... and the failure to file the affidavit was the
result of a mistake." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (1992).
108. Id. (emphasis added).
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has the burden to offer evidence of that fact at the time of filing. 09 In
Thompson, while the plaintiff repeated the words necessary to make the
allegation, they were patently false." 0 The fact that she proceeded pro se
should not be sufficient to allow such misrepresentation in a blatant at:
tempt to avoid the strict requirements of the filing requirements of
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1.
IV. INEFFECTIvE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

At first blush, this appears to be a topic better suited to criminal law or
procedure than legal ethics. However, since the claim is so closely related
to malpractice, and so often focuses on a lawyer's failure to comply with
aspirational or mandatory standards of professional conduct,"' it is
briefly raised here. Moreover, the claim is becoming increasingly popular
as a ground for reversal of a conviction. This year, the claim was raised in
at least thirty court of appeals and thirteen supreme court cases.
As has been true since 1984:
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective
as to require reversal ...has two components. First, the defendant must
show ...

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not function-

ing as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second . . .that the deficient performance . .. [was] so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a ... trial whose result is reliable."'

Using this rather stringent standard, 1 3 Georgia courts reject the vast
majority of claims. One typical response of the courts has been to classify
many of counsel's actions as strategic decisions,"' thus insulating them
109.
110.

Id.
201 Ga. App. at 482, 411 S.E.2d at 323-24.

111. As stated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), "[pirevailing norms of
practice reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like ...are guides to
determining what is reasonable .... " Id. at 688.
112. Id. at 687.
113. Proving ineffective assistance of counsel may raise unforeseen difficulties. In Cauley
v. State, 203 Ga. App. 299, 416 S.E.2d 575 (1992), defendant claimed that his lawyer failed
or refused to call certain witnesses on his behalf. Defendant was told by the trial court that
having the lawyer testify to that effect would operate as a waiver of the attorney client
privilege. Id. at 299, 416 S.E.2d at 576. Defendant declined, and the trial court's action was
upheld by the court of appeals. Id. at 301, 416 S.E.2d at 577-78.
114. See Noland v. State, 202 Ga. App. 125, 413 S.E.2d 509 (1991); Louis v. State, 202
Ga. App. 681, 415 S.E.2d 289 (1992); Taylor v. State, 203 Ga. App. 210, 416 S.E.2d 554
(1992), all holding that decisions regarding which witnesses to call are strategic and within
the discretion of counsel. See also Snyder v. State, 201 Ga. App. 66, 410 S.E.2d 173 (1991),
in which defense counsel allowed the state's witness' relatives to remain on the jury. Id. at
69, 410 S.E.2d at 177. In rejecting the ineffective assistance claim, the court held this action
was permissible since the appellant's family apparently agreed to it. Id.
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from attack. 1 5 Often, courts find that1 7a lawyer's action resulted in no real
prejudice,11 6 even if it was deficient.1
With the increase in ineffectiveness claims, however, has come a corresponding increase in refusals to consider claims for procedural irregularities, most notably the failure to raise the issue at the first available opportunity.1 18 For instance, in White v. Kelso,119 Victor White, represented
by court-appointed counsel, was convicted of robbery. After trial, the
court appointed another attorney on appeal, but the new attorney raised
no issues other than the sufficiency of the evidence. After the court affirmed the conviction, White filed a habeas corpus petition pro se, raising
ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time.120 Relying upon earlier
precedent establishing that "[n]ew counsel must raise the ineffectiveness
of previous counsel at the first possible stage of post-conviction review," ' the court held "in this case 'previous counsel' is not the trial
counsel, but appellate counsel. When petitioner made his first appearance
in his own behalf, the claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel had already
been waived by his appellate counsel."" 2
12
'
An interesting twist on this rule arose this year. In Ryan v. Thomas,
defendant was represented by three Fulton County public defenders, one
at trial, one on motion for new trial, and a third on appeal. In his pro se
habeas corpus petition, *defendant first raised the ineffective assistance
claim. The court could have refused to consider it, based upon White, but
chose not to do so, saying:
[A]ttorneys in a public defender's office are .

.

. members of a law firm

. , , [and] are not to be considered "new" counsel for the purpose of
raising ineffective assistance claims under White v. Kelso ....

[A] de-

fendant's right to raise such a claim may not be barred by the failure of a
115. "[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered
sound trial strategy.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. See also HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 63
(EC 7-7).
116. See, e.g., Talley v. State, 200 Ga. App. 442, 408 S.E.2d 463 (1991) (mistake regarding inclusion of inappropriate parts of transcript).
117. See, e.g., Brenneman v. State, 200 Ga. App. 111, 407 S.E.2d 93 (1991) (Andrews, J.,
concurring) (Sixth Amendment protections had not yet attached).
118. See, e.g., Watts v. State, 200 Ga. App. 54, 406 S.E.2d 562 (1991) (ineffective assistance claim waived by not raising it at the earliest possible moment, i.e., in the motion for
new trial).

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

261 Ga. 32, 401 S.E.2d 733 (1991).
Id. at 32, 401 S.E.2d at 734.
Id.
Id. at 33, 401 S.E.2d at 734.
261 Ga. 661, 409 S.E.2d 507 (1991).
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succession of attorney from the same public defender's office to raise
it.124

In part, the court's treatment of the public defenders as a law firm was
grounded on the premise that "it would not be reasonable to expect one
member of a law firm to assert the ineffectiveness of another member,"125
a notion which is consistent with both common sense and Georgia's Canons of Ethics.'
Even though Ryan did not concern a disqualification motion the case
may be significant to conflict of interest and disqualification issues for
two reasons.1 2 7 First, it seems contrary to the position of Georgia courts
that conflict of interest and disqualification principles are rarely proper
for per se treatment. 2 " Second, it treats the public defender's office in the
same manner as it would treat a private firm.1 2 9 Although this may seem
appropriate, it is at odds with the rule in Frazier v.State,30 and with
Standards 38181 and 6912 that exempt government lawyers from automatic vicarious disqualification principles. Since one of the reasons articulated for such exemption is the lack of "financial interest in the success of departmental representation that is inherent in private
practice,"1 2 it is difficult to understand the real basis for disparate treatment of public defenders on any issue.

124. Id. at 662, 409 S.E.2d at 509. Cf. Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439, 405 S.E.2d 660 (1991),
in which the supreme court remanded to the trial court for a hearing on the ineffective
assistance claim. Id. at 447, 405 S.E.2d at 667-68. Although Hayes raised this issue for the
first time on appeal, "it was timely raised because Hayes has been represented by trial counsel until this time." Id. at 446-47, 405 S.E.2d at 667.
125. 261 Ga. at 662, 409 S.E.2d at 508.
126. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 78. Standard 38 imputes one lawyer's disqualification
for a conflict of interest to other lawyers in a private firm. Id. This principle is based upon
concerns articulated in the American Bar Association Model Code Canons 4 (A Lawyer
Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client), 5 (A Lawyer Should Exercise
Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client), and 9 (A Lawyer Should Avoid
Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety). See Blumenfeld v. Borenstein, 247 Ga.
406, 276 S.E.2d 607 (1981).
127. 261 Ga. at 661, 409 S.E.2d at 507.
128. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 258 Ga. 353, 369 S.E.2d 478 (1988); Georgia Dep't of
Human Resources v. Sistrunk, 249 Ga. 543, 291 S.E.2d 524 (1982) (Jordan, C.J., dissenting);
Blumenfeld, 247 Ga. at 406, 276 S.E.2d at 607.
129. 261 Ga. at 662, 409 S.E.2d at 508-09.
130. 257 Ga. 690, 362 S.E.2d 351 (1987).
131. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 78. Standard 38 states: "This rule does not extend to
the partners and associates of part time solicitors .... ." Id.
132. Id. at 82. Standard 69 states: "The term 'client' as used in this Standard shall not
include a public agency or public officer or employee when represented by a lawyer who is a
full time public official." Id.
133. 257 Ga.at 694, 362 S.E.2d at 357 (quoting ABA Formal Op. 342).
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V.

AUTHORITY TO SETTLE CASES

Georgia courts have struggled with the extent to which parties to suits

are bound by settlements made by their lawyers."' Generally, once a lawyer negotiates a settlement, all parties are bound by it, even those who
change their minds. 13 5 In several recent cases, however, lawyers have been

challenged for making settlements their clients never authorized."3 Although this raises difficult enough questions about enforcement of the
agreement against either the client or his adversary, they become even
more difficult in cases in which the lawyer has already cashed the settle13 7
ment check.
In Lewis v. Uselton3s8 the court raised these questions in an unusual
way. Lewis sued his former clients, the Useltons, for his share of a personal injury recovery, as provided by a written contingent fee contract.
Lewis settled the case without the approval, and contrary to the wishes,
of the Useltons. Relying upon the rule in Brumbelow v. Northern Propane Gas Co.,1 3 9 the trial court summarily enforced the fee agreement, 1 0
141
with Lewis' concurrence.

134. See L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics, 42 MERCER L. REv. 347, 353 (1990).
135. See, e.g., Goss v. Cone, 200 Ga. App. 259, 407 S.E.2d 484 (1991), in which a car
accident victim agreed to accept defendant's policy in full settlement; after negotiation with
his own insurer regarding underinsured defendants, he changed his mind and refused to
cash the check. Id. at 256-60, 407 S.E.2d at 485. The court of appeals held that the trial
court erred in failing to enforce the original settlement agreement. Id. at 260, 407 S.E.2d at
486.
136. See, e.g., Dickey v. Harden, 202 Ga. App. 645, 414 S.E.2d 924 (1992).
137. See First Dixie Properties v. Chrysler Corp., 202 Ga. App. 145, 413 S.E.2d 464
(1991). Thomason negotiated settlement with defendant; because of the negotiations, defendant never answered the suit. Plaintiff disapproved the settlement offer, but Thomason
proceeded anyway, cashing the check, absconding with the funds, and failing to dismiss the
suit. When plaintiff found out, he hired a new lawyer, who got a default judgment. Defendants moved to set aside the default and enforce the settlement made by Thomason. Id. at
145, 413 S.E.2d at 464-65. The court refused to set aside the judgment unless the allegation
of fraud was "unmixed with the negligence or fault of the movant." Id. at 146, 413 S.E.2d at
465 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d)(2) (1992)). Since appellees never obtained Thomason's
dismissal of the suit, they were negligent in failing to answer, especially after appellant disavowed Thomason's settlement. Thomason was disbarred for this and other activities, most
concerning the failure to account for or refund clients' property. In re Thomason, 259 Ga.
248, 379 S.E.2d 405 (1989).
138. 202 'Ga. App. 875, 416 S.E.2d 94 (1992).
139. 251 Ga. 674, 308 S.E.2d 544 (1983). The court held that apparent authority of an
attorney justifies enforcement against his client even when the defendant does not detrimentally rely upon the settlement. Id. at 676-77, 308 S.E.2d at 547.
140. Apparently, the propriety of enforcing the settlement itself was not raised as an
issue in this case.
141. 202 Ga. App. at 876, 416 S.E.2d at 95.
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Lewis then sued the Useltons for his fees. In his motion for summary
judgment, Lewis produced a written contract that expressly gave him
"full power and authority to settle, compromise or take such action as he
might deem proper.

142

He also stated that he had never told his clients

that they had any authority over settlement of their case.
In affirming the denial of Lewis' motion for summary judgment, the
court of appeals said the issue was "whether appellant's settlement was
authorized so as to relieve him of liability to his clients and allow him to
collect his fee. 1" Narrowly construing Brumbelow, the court held that
"[a]lthough Brumbelow allows opposing counsel to rely on an 'apparent'
plenary authority to settle, it does not create a presumption as against
the client that any such authority existed.'
Thus, the court in Lewis distinguished between enforcement of a settlement between parties to a suit, and between the lawyer and his disapproving client. Although defendants could insist upon enforcing the settlement, plaintiffs were not necessarily bound in a dispute with Lewis
this score, the attorney had to prove his auover fees based upon it. 14On
s
thority "unequivocally."

The court next faced Lewis' claim that his written contract was sufficient to meet that burden. He had two major hurdles to clear. The first
was O.C.G.A. section 15-19-6, which provides that "[w]ithout special authority, attorneys cannot receive anything in discharge of a client's claim
but the full amount in cash." 4" Second, DR 7-102(A)(9) bars settlement
of a client's case without "proper authorization.""7 The court responded
by holding:
[T]his ...contract ...gives the attorney no "right" to do anything the

clients did not authorize him to do; it gives full "power and authority"
to settle, compromise or take such action as he might deem proper,
which is no more than the common authority attorneys have to implement settlements determined by the client .... This "full power and

authority" to settle accrued only after the amount of the settlement had
been approved by the client ....
Such broad power.., cannot be de48
scribed as "special" authority.

142. Id. at 875, 416 S.E.2d at 95.

143. Id. at 876, 416 S.E.2d at 95. Under Rogers v. Pettigrew, 138 Ga. 528, 75 S.E. 631
(1912) (cited in 202 Ga. App. 875, 416 S.E.2d 94 (1992)), a lawyer who makes an unauthorized settlement forfeits any right to a fee.
144. 202 Ga. App. at 879, 416 S.E.2d at 97.

145. Id.
146. O.C.G.A. § 15-19-6 (1990) (emphasis added).
147. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 67 (DR 7-102(A)(9)) (emphasis added).
148. 202 Ga. App. at 879, 416 S.E.2d at 97-98.
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The holding is undoubtedly correct. Furthermore, the court was wise to
express its strong disapproval of Lewis' view that since he was a forty
percent partner with his clients, and thus unlikely to act in a manner that
would harm his own interests as much as his clients', the arrangement
was consistent with his clients' best interest. " '
What is unsatisfactory about the opinion is that it sends mixed signals
about the possibility of an attorney gaining complete authority to settle if
the contract were written differently. At one point, the court relies upon
the rule that contracts are construed against the writer to support its rejection of Lewis' claim.150 This suggests some ambiguity in the contract,
leaving room for misinterpretation by clients. If the contract were, unenforceable as a matter of law, that would be irrelevant.
But the opinion cites, in the next paragraph, DR 7-102(A)(9)'s requirement of proper authorization, to suggest that one cannot get a client's
authorization without first providing the specifics of the offer.' This reasoning would support a rule holding any such contract void as a matter of
public policy.
The very question raised here was raised by Lewis on motion for reconsideration; ultimately, the court refused to give a clear answer. Noting
that the rules in O.C.G.A. section 15-19-6 and DR 7-102(A)(9) are "not
ones [the court] created, 152 the court said the question must be left "to
the Bar and the individual case." ' However, it is hardly unreasonable to
conclude that "the Bar" (i.e., the Supreme Court of Georgia) has already
decided the matter by adopting DR 102(A)(9).
VI.

DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL

Today, lawyers often move to disqualify counsel or upset decisions because of conflicts of interest (switching sides, suing former clients, etc.), '4
149. Id. at 880-81, 416 S.E.2d at 98.
150. Id. at 879-80, 416 S.E.2d at 98.
151. Id. at 880, 416 S.E.2d at 98.
152. Id. at 881, 416 S.E.2d at 99.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Dismuke v. C & S Trust Co., 261 Ga. 525, 407 S.E.2d 739 (1991), an action
to set aside probate of a will because of an existing common law marriage. Appellant moved
to disqualify the attorney representing the decedent's widow on the ground that the attorney had previously represented appellant in two divorce actions stemming from common
law marriages. Id. at 527, 407 S.E.2d at 740. The court affirmed the denial of the motion
because appellant did not demonstrate a substantial relationship between the current suit
and that in which the attorney previously represented the party. Id. at 526-27, 407 S.E.2d at
739-40. See also Love v. State, 202 Ga. App. 889, 416 S.E.2d 99 (1992). At a preliminary
hearing in a cocaine case, Durham appeared as assistant district attorney. He then joined

the firm representing the defendant in the case. Id. at 889-90, 416 S.E.2d at 100. In affirming the disqualification of Durham's firm, the court held the representation improper
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or violations of other ethical rules.15 In Georgia, such motions have been
very troublesome, especially when they concern part time public officials.
In Young v. Champion,' an attorney practicing in Albany, Georgia's
Recorder's Court was disqualified by the judge because she was a member'
of the city commission that hired Recorder's Court judges. The court of
appeals upheld the disqualification, but never quoted a specific Canon or
DR as a basis for doing so. Rather, the court relied on some rather general principles, saying:
lilt is ...

essential that the system ...

[be] maintained that the public

shall have absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of its administration ....
ITlhe disqualification was to avoid the appearance of
impropriety ....
[I]n those cases in which a city commissioner seeks to
practice before . . . an employee . . . that smacks of impropriety,
and
157
falls within the inherent power of the court to prohibit.

The court gave a tepid endorsement to the disqualification, saying, that
"[u]nder these circumstances.

. .

the judge did not err. .

.

. [S]uch rep-

resentation brought or tended to bring disrepute upon the administration
of justice and the practice of law before his court."' 58 Since the judge first
attempted to find a substitute, and the lawyer's response landed her a
contempt citation,' 6 9 it is not surprising that the court would endorse the
result under the circumstances. It is unclear, however, what lasting principle the court establishes in Young.
In 1989, the supreme court decided that a city council member in a
position like the lawyer in Young should not represent clients in Recorder's Court, even if he abstained from voting on judges' appointments. 60 In FAO 89-2, the court first looked to DR 8-101(A)(2), which
provides that "[a] lawyer who holds public office shall not: use his public
unless it should appear that he took no action in the case while counsel for the
opposing party, and it was clearly shown that he did not acquire, by reason of
such employment, any knowledge or information concerning the case, and even in
these circumstances the court might, in its discretion, disqualify him, looking to
the full administration of justice.
Id. at 890, 416 S.E.2d at 101. Although the court disqualified the whole firm, it made no
specific reference to imputed disqualification principles.
155. See, e.g., Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holt, 200 Ga. App. 759, 409 S.E.2d 852 (1991),
in which appellant sought to disqualify appellee's counsel on the ground that counsel was an
essential witness for his clients. The court affirmed the denial of the motion on the ground
that counsel's testimony was cumulative in light of the documentation available. Id. at 771,

409 S.E.2d at 863.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

142 Ga. App. 687, 236 S.E.2d 783 (1977).
Id. at 689-90, 236 S.E.2d at 784-85.
Id. at 690, 236 S.E.2d at 785.
Id. at 688, 236 S.E.2d at 784.
HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 144 (FAO 89-2).
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position to influence, or attempt to influence, a tribunal to act in favor of
himself or his client.""' The court held that since a city council member
is a public official and also the judge's employer, "[e]ven the effort to
avoid the [influence] changes the nature of the relationship between the
judge and the attorney. "162 Deeming it improper for the lawyer to avoid
his public responsibility of voting for judges in exchange for private gain,
the opinion says, "[ijf correspondent follows the advice of this opinion he
will disqualify himself from representation before the judges of the Recorder's Court."163
Young and FAO 89-2 might have lead a lawyer acting as commissioner
to conclude it is unethical to represent clients in courts where judges are
essentially the lawyer's employees. That conclusion was tested in Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc. v. West," 4 in which counsel moved to disqualify
Fulton County Commissioner Joyner from practice in the State Court of
Fulton County.' " Although county commissioners do not select state
court judges, they do vote on judges' salary supplements.166 Even in the
face of Joyner's objection that he had abstained on such decisions, precedent seemed to dictate disqualification. Nevertheless, the court upheld
the trial court's denial of the disqualification motion, saying "[a) prohibition against representing clients before the state and/or superior courts of
constitute a major
the county of an attorney's residence obviously would
6
impediment to his right to practice law generally.'
This result can be attacked on several grounds. First, as was true in the
earlier cases, abstention seems inappropriate on a matter of public responsibility. As the supreme court said, even this abstention altered the
normal relationship between attorney and judge." Second, the difference
between judicial appointments and judicial pay votes is one of degree
only. 1 9 Third, the fact that attorneys' practices may be harmed by disqualification is not reason enough to ignore a conflict and allow government officials to sacrifice the public good for private profit.1'" Finally, the

161.

Id. (citing DR 8-101(A)(2)).

162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. (FAO 89-2).
Id.
200 Ga. App. 402, 408 S.E.2d 180 (1991).
Id. at 402, 408 S.E.2d at 180.

166. O.C.G.A. § 15-7-22 (1990).
167. 200 Ga. App. at 403, 408 S.E.2d at 182.
168. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 144 (FAO 89-2).
169. The court stated that "[c]ommissioners ... are empowered only to vote on salary
supplements for such judges . . . ." 200 Ga. App. at 403, 408 S.E.2d at 181-82. It may be
splitting hairs to point it out, but under O.C.G.A. § 15-7-22 (1990), judges of state court are
actually paid from county funds and the commissioners are authorized to supplement the
compensation established by state law. Id.
170. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 144 (FAO 89-2).
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court in West does not even mention FAO 89-2171 which is just one more
indication of the courts' ambivalence about the precedential authority of
these opinions.
VII.

A.

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

"The Joint Client Exception"

In Peterson v. Baumwell4'2 the court had to interpret the joint client
exception to the attorney-client privilege. Steen and Peterson, partners in
a renovation/rental project, were both represented by Polonsky. On Peterson's recommendation, they hired Baumwell to obtain zoning authori1
zation for their project. "

Although Baumwell appeared to have done his job, it turned out that
the authorization documents were forgeries, and Steen and Peterson sued
him. Eventually, Steen cross claimed against Peterson, alleging that Pe17
terson and Baumwell acted in concert. '

In discovery, attorneys for Steen and Baumwell deposed Polonsky, who
had since withdrawn from representation of both Steen and Peterson.
When Peterson's new attorney claimed the attorney-client privilege on
his client's behalf, Polonsky refused to answer. The trial court ordered
Polonsky to answer, and the court of appeals had to decide whether the
joint client exception applied in a case in which a third party, namely
75
Baumwell, would undoubtedly benefit from the information.
The court of appeals affirmed on three grounds. First, the court held
that Peterson's failure to specifically respond and argue against Steen's
motion to compel amounted to "acquiescence by silence" to the trial
court's ruling.1 76 Second, the court relied upon authority, from Georgia
and elsewhere.1 7 7 Third, the court found that the disclosure to Baumwell
would not result in irreparable harm to Peterson.1 8 The ultimate result
may be a sound one, but the court's reasoning certainly is suspect for
several reasons.
On the acquiescence issue, Peterson first invoked the privilege and
Polonsky acted in accordance with Peterson's stated wishes. Although Peterson did not argue to the trial court on Steen's motion to compel, he
refused to waive the privilege. Furthermore, Peterson's attorney appeared
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

200'Ga. App. at 402, 408 S.E.2d at 180.
202 Ga. App. 283, 414 S.E.2d 278 (1991).
Id. at 283, 414 S.E.2d at 279.
Id.
Id. at 284, 414 S.E.2d at 279-80.
Id. at 285, 414 S.E.2d at 281.
Id. at 286, 414 S.E.2d at 281.
Id.

LEGAL ETHICS
at oral argument, if only "[as] amicus," as he called it.", Holding that it
was the "burden of the client, and not the attorney" to prove the applicability of the privilege, the court saddled the client with a waiver of his
claim to the privilege. 8 0
This holding, which was probably unnecessary, seems harsh. After all,
an attorney is his client's agent.' 8" With his superior legal knowledge, it is
an attorney's right and responsibility to make his client's claims. Certainly there was no impropriety for Peterson's attorney to raise the issue
at the deposition. No further action, especially by Peterson, was
necessary.
The ethical rules require attorneys to invoke the privilege unless a client orders otherwise. 82s Additionally, the Georgia privilege statutes all
speak in terms of prohibiting lawyers from disclosing communications
with their clients.1 a3 With that perspective, it is difficult to see why a client has any obligation to object; rather it is assumed that the lawyer will
raise it.
The precedent supporting the court's holding in Baumwel also is suspect."" The court first cites Gearhart v. Etheridge,'" which cites Georgia
8
for the proposition that "if two or more persons
Law of Evidence"'
jointly consult [or retain] an attorney . . . the communications which either makes to the attorney are not privileged in the event of any subsequent litigation between the parties.' 8 7 Gearhartconcerned a dispute between one joint venturer and the estate of another. Both venturers
originally had used one accountant, and the question was whether the
accountant-client privilege applied in an action essentially between former partners. 8 The basis for rejecting the privilege claim was that
"[there was no intent to keep the transactions of one secret from the
other."' 89 This is the very reason for courts' refusal to recognize the privilege in a falling out between partners, that although they intended to
keep their business private vis-a-vis outsiders, they had no such intent
between themselves. But there was no evidence that Peterson and Steen

179. Id. at 285, 414 S.E.2d at 281.
180. Id.
181. O.C.G.A. § 15-19-5 (1990).
182. See, e.g., HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 58 (DR 4-101(B)); id. at 77 (Standard 28); and
d. at 67 (DR 7-101(A)).

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

O.C.G.A. §§ 24-9-24, -25 (1982).
202 Ga. App. at 283, 414 S.E.2d at 278.
232 Ga. 638, 208 S.E.2d 460 (1974).
THOMAS GREENE, GEORGIA LAW OF EVIDENCE (1957).

232 Ga. at 640, 208 S.E.2d at 462 (citing GREENE, supra note 186, § 185).
Id. at 638-39, 208 S.E.2d at 461.
Id. at 640, 208 S.E.2d at 461.
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took Baumwell into their confidence; he was simply a third party hired to
perform a specific job, namely prepare zoning documents. 9"
The court also relied upon Atwood v. Sipple."' However, Atwood concerned a motion to disqualify counsel for conflicts of interest when the
lawyer who originally represented three joint venturers then represented
two of them against the third.192 The opinion contains no real discussion
of the privilege, except to note that when "joint venturers all meet with
counsel at the same time for purposes of discussing their venture, the
privilege does not apply as between the venturers."1 8 Once again, this
case establishes that the privilege will not prevent disclosure of information that was not intended to be kept confidential from the one requesting the inf6rmation,' 4 but that is very different from disclosing the information to a third party to the venture.
Finally, the court cites Hoffman v. Labutzke, 15 a 1940 Wisconsin case.
In Hoffman insured and insurer were originally represented by common
counsel. After trial, insured told insurer he had perjured himself, information that might benefit both the insurer and the plaintiff in the case.
Nevertheless, the Wisconsin court held the privilege had been waived. 96
As the court of appeals admits, the question arose in the insurer's motion
for new trial, and Hoffman did not directly address the issue raised in
Peterson. Even the Wisconsin court's cited language is very limited, saying only, "[e]ach [party] waived the privilege . . .as to reporting his

communications to the other whenever those communications affected
the interest of the other .... ,1,7 Thus, Hoffman presents rather weak
support for the result.
As to the third basis for the decision, that the disclosure would not
damage Peterson,19 8 the best response is that application of the privilege
has never depended upon a showing of harm from disclosure. The law
presumes harm from disclosure and concomitant harm to the sanctity of
the relationship, without regard to the character of the information
revealed.

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

202 Ga. App. at 283, 414 S.E.2d at 279.
182 Ga. App. 831, 357 S.E.2d 273, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 944 (1987).
182 Ga. App. at 833-34, 357 S.E.2d at 275-76.
Id. at 834, 357 S.E.2d at 276 (emphasis added).
Id.
289 N.W. 652 (Wis. 1940).
Id. at 657.
202 Ga. App. at 286, 414 S.E.2d at 281 (citing 289 N.W. at 657) (emphasis added).
Id.
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B.

Confidences and Secrets

The most interesting case regarding the attorney-client privilege is
Goldstein v. Goldstein, 99 a divorce case in which the wife argued that her
lawyer husband's contingent fee contracts were marital assets. Since the
refusal to treat the contracts as marital assets is certain to be discussed
by family law experts, the focus in this Article is on a discovery issue. The
wife sought to compel the husband to disclose retainer agreements and
settlement offers in
pending cases, the estimated value of pending cases,
2 0
and client ledgers.

The majority refused to consider the issue since the contracts were not
marital assets. 20 However, Justice Hunt, joined by Justices Weltner and
Bell, considered the question, saying that the contracts' status as
nonmarital assets did not lead inexorably to a finding of irrelevance and
nondiscoverability.0 2
Justice Hunt found that there were "serious problems regarding the
potential violation of the attorney-client privilege '" ° , in approving plaintiff's discovery requests, but proposed protective orders, in camera review, and redaction to minimize confidentiality concerns.2 0 ' Justice
Hunt's approach seems the better one for several reasons. First, his approach is consistent with modern discovery theory, the basic rule being
that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter .

. .

. It is not ground for objec-

tion that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.12 0

With this general rule, courts have liberally

construed relevance to include many materials that are not admissible in
and of themselves. The evidence in Goldstein easily meets the broad test,
and the wife "should be able to discover the existence of any contingent
contracts entered into before the filing for divorce, the extent of any work
performed on those contracts, and evidence regarding the reasonable
value of work performed on those contracts." 200
Although Justice Hunt's caution is understandable, the fact is that a
good deal of the material sought is not privileged, for several reasons.
First, some information about the husband's clients may have already
been made public. For those cases already filed, a huge amount of infor199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206..

262 Ga. 136, 414 S.E.2d 474 (1992).
Id. at 136, 414 S.E.2d at 475.
Id.
Id. at 137, 414 S.E.2d at 476 (Hunt, J., Weltner, J., & Bell, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 137-38, 414 S.E.2d at 476.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11.26(b)(1) (Supp. 1992).
262 Ga. at 137, 414 S.E.2d at 476.
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mation from docket entries, pleadings, motions, and discovery was already public record. No such information could be privileged.
Second, much information, not yet publicly revealed, was obviously revealed to the husband by clients in anticipation of public use. Clients'
allegations and much supporting information would not be privileged,
since the clients did not intend that the information remain confidential."'7 It is for this reason that courts hold that the hiring of a lawyer or
the fee agreement with him are generally beyond the scope of the privilege.2 08 The same would be true in Goldstein.
That does not mean that the husband's objections should be treated
lightly. Clearly, a good deal of the information discussed above would be
classified by the Canons of Ethics as "secrets," 09 even if not privileged.
But as "secrets," the lawyer is only prohibited from voluntarily revealing
the information without the client's consent; obviously complying with a
court order to reveal is not a voluntary disclosure, and as such, it is expressly allowed by rules. 10 Thus, Justice Hunt's requirement that courts
should "where necessary,

. . .

redact[] .. .names, addresses, civil action

numbers, and other identifying information of clients in any documents," ' may accord even greater protection to certain information than
is strictly required.

207. The information is not confidential if not intended to remain confidential. See, e.g.,
Fowler v. Sheridan, 157 Ga. 271, 121 S.E. 308 (1924).
208. See O.C.G.A. § 24-9-25 (1982), which states that "an attorney shall be both competent and compellable to testify for or against his client as to any matter or thing, the knowledge of which he may have acquired in any other manner." O.C.G.A. § 24-9-25..
209. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 57-58. DR 4-401 defines a secret as "other information
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client." Id.
210. "A lawyer may reveal: (1) confidences or secrets with the consent of the client...
[or] (2) . . .when . . .required by law or court order." Id. at 77 (citing Standard 28(b)).

211. 262 Ga. at 138, 414 S.E.2d at 476.

